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Abstract: 
One of the more striking aspects of Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s Phenomenology of Perception (1945) is his 
use of psychological case studies in pathology. For Merleau-Ponty, a philosophical interpretation of 
phenomena like aphasia and psychic blindness promises to shed light not just on the nature of 
pathology, but on the nature of human existence more generally. In this paper, I show that although 
Merleau-Ponty is surely a pioneer in this use of pathology, his work is deeply indebted to an earlier 
philosophical study of pathology offered by the German Neo-Kantian Ernst Cassirer in the third 
volume of the Philosophy of Symbolic Forms (1929). More specifically, I argue that Merleau-Ponty, in 
fact, follows Cassirer in placing Kant’s notion of the productive imagination at the centre of his 
account of pathology and the features of existence it illuminates. Recognizing the debt Merleau-
Ponty’s account of pathology has to the Kantian tradition not only acts as a corrective to more 
recent interpretation of Merleau-Ponty’s views of pathology (Dreyfus, Romdenh-Romluc), but also 
recommends we resist the prevailing tendency to treat Merleau-Ponty’s philosophy as anti-Kantian. 




One of the more striking aspects of Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s Phenomenology of Perception (1945) is his 
use of psychological case studies in pathology.1  For Merleau-Ponty, a philosophical interpretation of 
phenomena like aphasia and psychic blindness promises to shed light not just on the nature of 
pathology, but on the nature of human existence more generally.2  Yet although Merleau-Ponty is 
surely a pioneer in this use of pathology, in this paper I show his work is deeply indebted to an 
earlier philosophical study of pathology offered by the German Neo-Kantian Ernst Cassirer in the 
third volume of the Philosophy of Symbolic Forms (1929).3  More specifically, I argue that Merleau-
Ponty, in fact, follows Cassirer in placing Kant’s notion of the productive imagination at the center of 
his account of pathology and the features of existence it illuminates.   
Recognizing Merleau-Ponty’s debt to Cassirer and the Kantian tradition in this regard is 
crucial for two reasons.  In the first place, it recommends we revise the prevailing way of 
interpreting Merleau-Ponty’s use of pathology.  Though the details of their views diverge, influential 
commentators like Hubert Dreyfus and Komarine Romdenh-Romluc agree insofar as they take 
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Merleau-Ponty to use pathology primarily to teach us about bodily action and movement.4  Even if this 
line of interpretation, which I shall label the ‘motor-centric’ interpretation, captures aspects of 
Merleau-Ponty’s account, I show that it has too narrow a focus and leads us to neglect Merleau-
Ponty’s more fundamental aims with pathology, viz., elucidating what makes it possible for us to 
engage with the world in a wide variety of ways, as much through movement and perception, as 
through thought and emotion.  I claim this is ultimately why Merleau-Ponty is drawn to the Kantian 
account of the productive imagination, a capacity that underwrites the different ways we engage with 
the world through ‘sensibility’ and ‘understanding’.   
However, there may be a reason that those writing about Merleau-Ponty’s pathology have 
overlooked its Kantian features, viz., the prevailing tendency to interpret Merleau-Ponty as anti-
Kantian.  Throughout the Phenomenology, Merleau-Ponty mounts criticism against a certain form of 
idealism that he labels ‘intellectualism’.  At times, he raises objections to Kant in this vein,5 and, for 
this reason, many have come to identify the arch-intellectualist for Merleau-Ponty as none other 
than Kant.6  As a result, there is a consensus among interpreters of both Kant and Merleau-Ponty 
that we should regard their philosophies as competing alternatives.7  Yet in this paper I offer reasons 
for why we should correct this view.  Although there are no doubt aspects of Kant’s philosophy that 
Merleau-Ponty rejects, Merleau-Ponty is also a subtle and sympathetic reader of Kant.  Indeed, there 
are features of Kant’s philosophy that Merleau-Ponty regards as proto-phenomenological and he 
endeavors to preserve and develop them within his phenomenological framework.  In what follows, 
I highlight one such aspect of Kant’s philosophy: the productive imagination.  As we shall find, in 
virtue of his sensitive reading of Kant and Cassirer with respect to the productive imagination, 
rather than rejecting this feature of the Kantian account, Merleau-Ponty, in fact, gives it a central 
place within his account of pathology and, indeed, human existence.  This, in turn, suggests a revised 
reading of Merleau-Ponty’s relationship to the Kantian tradition is in order.   
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In order to expose the Kantian and Neo-Kantian roots of Merleau-Ponty’s analysis of 
pathology, I begin with a discussion of Cassirer’s interpretation of pathology (§2).  I next turn to 
Merleau-Ponty’s assessment of Cassirer’s approach (§3).  I then present Merleau-Ponty’s own 
account of pathology, emphasizing the advantages my ‘imagination-centric’ interpretation has over 
the motor-centric interpretation and the advantages Merleau-Ponty takes his account to have over 
Cassirer’s.  I conclude by arguing that appreciating this Kantian aspect of Merleau-Ponty’s 
philosophy points toward the need to re-conceive Merleau-Ponty’s relationship to the Kantian 
tradition (§5). 
 
§2. Cassirer’s Diagnosis of Pathology: The Representation Function 
In the early decades of the 20th century, more and more attention was paid in psychology to 
problems in pathology.  Psychologists, such as Head, Gelb, and Goldstein, conducted extensive 
research and published case studies on patients suffering from three interrelated types of disorders: 
aphasia, agnosia, and apraxia.8  Whereas aphasia relates to disorders affecting speech, e.g., being 
unable to name the color of a swatch placed before you (‘color amnesia’), agnosia relates to 
disorders affecting one’s capacities for recognition, e.g., psychic blindness, and for thought, e.g., 
being unable to perform basic arithmetic or understand analogies and metaphors.  Meanwhile 
apraxia relates to disorders affecting one’s capacity for action and movement: while a patient may be 
able to perform a ‘concrete action’ in response to an actual task, e.g., sewing a wallet at work, she 
may be unable to perform an ‘abstract action’ in response to a merely imagined or possible scenario, 
e.g., mimicking the act of sewing a wallet in a psychologist’s office. 
In the 1920s, Cassirer became familiar with this research and came to regard it as a source of 
philosophical insight.9  This culminates in a lengthy chapter in the third volume of the Philosophy of 
Symbolic Forms titled, ‘Toward a Pathology of the Symbolic Consciousness’.  As the title of the 
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chapter suggests, Cassirer thinks pathology can teach us something about ‘symbolic consciousness’ 
and, in particular, he thinks it reveals something about what he calls the ‘function of representation’ 
[Darstellungsfunktion].   
 
2.1 The representat ion funct ion  
For our purposes, one of the most salient features of Cassirer’s Philosophy of Symbolic Forms is his 
claim that our consciousness is structured in such a way that we cannot have perceptual experiences 
that are devoid of meaning.10  Targeting sense-data views, Cassirer takes issue with the claim that 
perception involves meaningless sense data we, then, interpret or mentally process: “We can never 
completely separate the sensory as such, as some naked “raw material” of sensation, from the whole 
complex of meaning relationships” (‘Problem of the Symbol’ 416).11  Though Cassirer allows for the 
possibility that after the fact we can distinguish matter and meaning (form) in reflection, in experience, he 
claims, they form an “indivisible unity” (‘Problem’ 416).12   
In order to explain what in our consciousness provides for such pervasive meaningful 
perception, Cassirer introduces the notion of a ‘symbolic function’.  He characterizes a symbolic 
function as a structure of consciousness that allows us to experience the world in ‘symbolic’ form: it 
allows us to perceive the objects present to us as symbols of some meaning.  Cassirer defines a symbol 
as “the different way [sensory matter] appears and how it signifies and refers, according to the 
perspective of meaning under which it comes,” where the ‘perspective of meaning’ that determines 
what the object symbolizes is a symbolic function of consciousness (‘Problem’ 416).  He identifies 
three such ‘symbolic functions’: the expressive function [Ausdrucksfunktion], the representation 
function [Darstellungsfunktion], and the signification function [Bedeutungsfunktion].  He claims each 
function involves a unique ‘perspective of meaning’, which allows us to perceive things as symbolic 
in a distinctive way.  The expressive function allows us to see other persons, animate objects, and 
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even inanimate objects as expressing subjective states, e.g., seeing someone’s gesture as angry or a 
dog’s face as puzzled.  Meanwhile, the signification function is what enables us to take things to be a 
symbol of ‘pure relations’, such as mathematical relations or logical relations, e.g., seeing a wavy line 
as a symbol of the Sine function (PSFv3 200/231-233).   
In between the expressive and signification functions lies the representation function.  
According to Cassirer, the representation function allows us to understand what is present to us here 
and now as a sign of a meaning that is not only not-present, but also could be encountered in another 
situation:  
[with the representation function] the content first gains the imprint of a new universal form 
without losing its material ‘particularity’… it has become a sign which enables us to recognize 
[wiederzuerkennen] it again when it appears… for only then does it become possible to find 
again in the simple, as it were, punctual “here” and “now” of present experience a “not-
here” and a “not-now” (PSFv3 114/133).13  
 
For example, through the representation function, I am able to see this apple as a ‘sign’ of the 
concept ‘red’, where this concept is neither wholly located in, nor exhausted by this apple.  
Otherwise put, for Cassirer, the representation function is what allows us to see objects as bearers of 
properties.     
According to Cassirer, however, the representation function does not make just one meaning 
available to us; it saturates the object we experience with several possible meanings, meanings we 
could take the object to signify if we varied our point of view.  For example, though I may be 
focused right now on the redness of the apple, I could vary my point of view and take the apple to 
signify the concept ‘apple’, ‘round’, or ‘Fuji’.    As Cassirer makes this point, when we are guided by 
the representation function, the objects we experience are surrounded by a ‘vector of meaning’ [Sinn-
Vektor], where this vector includes not only the actual, but also possible meanings the object could 
signify (PSFv3 222/258).  When explaining how the representation function works, Cassirer makes 
what may seem like a surprising claim for a Neo-Kantian: representation does not occur discursively, 
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i.e., it does not occur through a judgment in which we subsume sense data under a concept.14  As 
Cassirer puts it, we “are not dealing with bare perceptive data, on which some sort of apperceptive 
acts are later grafted, through which they are interpreted, judged, transformed” (PSFv3 202/234).  In 
contrast to this discursive picture, Cassirer argues that the representation function proceeds through 
a particular non-discursive mode of perception that he calls ‘symbolically pregnant perception’ 
[symbolisch prägnanten Wahrnehmung] (PSFv3 240/279).  In interpreting the notion of ‘symbolic 
pregnance’ [symbolische Prägnanz], we should bear in mind that the term ‘Prägnanz’ is without a precise 
English equivalent.  This term stems, on the one hand, from the verb ‘prägen’, which means ‘to 
shape’ or ‘to mint’ and is often translated as ‘conciseness’ or ‘succinctness’.  This is the sense of the 
term that the Gestalt psychologists, like Wertheimer and Koehler, appeal to in their account of the 
‘laws of Prägnanz’, which govern how we perceptually organize the world.  On the other hand, 
‘Prägnanz’ also has etymological roots in the Latin ‘praegnans’, which carries both the connotation of 
‘expecting a child’ and ‘being full’.  As we see in the following definition, Cassirer’s use of ‘Prägnanz’ 
relates both to how we perceptually organize the world and find it full of meaning:15   
By symbolic pregnance we mean the way in which a perception as a sensory experience 
contains at the same time a certain nonintuitive meaning [“Sinn”] which it immediately and 
concretely represents…  It is this ideal interwovenness, this relatedness of the single 
perceptive phenomenon, given here and now, to a characteristic total meaning [Sinn-Ganzes] 
that the term “pregnance” is meant to designate (PSFv3 202/234).16  
 
What Cassirer has in mind, then, is the way in which an object’s ‘total meaning’ is present through its 
perceptual organization:  
it is the perception itself which by virtue of its own immanent organization, takes on a kind 
of spiritual articulation—which, being ordered in itself, also belongs to a determinate order 
of meaning [Sinnfügung] (PSFv3 202/234). 
 
When we perceive an object in this way, Cassirer suggests we perceive it as a ‘meaningful whole’ 
[Sinnganzen] in which “every particular aspect is always related to a comprehensive context 
[Zusammenhang],” i.e., a vector of meaning (PSFv3 238/277).  However, although we perceive the 
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object as full of meaning, Cassirer insists that we are not guided by a discursive act, which give us a 
mediate grasp of what we perceive; instead, we immediately see the object as meaningful: “it is… a life 
“in” meaning [Sinn].  It is not only subsequently received into this sphere but is, one might say, born 
into it” (PSFv3 202, translation modified/234).  
Though this analysis of the non-discursive nature of the representation function and 
pregnant perception may at first seem un-Kantian, Cassirer, in fact, takes himself to be making a 
very Kantian claim.  In particular, Cassirer takes himself to be developing Kant’s theory of the 
‘productive imagination’, which it will be useful to briefly sketch17  In the first Critique, Kant offers 
the following generic definition of the imagination: “Imaginat ion is the faculty for representing an 
object even without its presence in intuition” (B151).18  Oftentimes, this faculty will be exercised 
in a ‘reproductive’ way, e.g., when we form a representation of an object we have previously intuited; 
however, Kant argues that our imaginations are also capable of a productive exercise, in which we 
spontaneously produce representations without the object being present (see B152).  The 
transcendental activities of the productive imagination, in turn, play an important role in Kant’s 
analysis of experience, for he argues that experience is possible only if the productive imagination 
mediates between two other cognitive capacities: sensibility, i.e., our capacity for being affected by 
the world, and understanding, i.e., our capacity for thinking about the world (see A124).19  This, in 
turn, shapes our perceptual experience; hence Kant’s claim that, “the imagination is a necessary 
ingredient in perception itself” (A120fn ).   
Cassirer interprets Kant’s claims about the productive imagination as follows:  
[the productive imagination as] “ingredient of perception” in the strict sense can never be a 
factor which is simply added to the given sensation… to reinterpret it by judgment… Here 
we have no such subsequent completion but an act of original formation [Formung]… The 
meaning [Sinn] [of the intuition] is to be understood neither as a secondary and conceptual 
[sekundär-begriffliche] nor as an associative addition: rather, it is the simple meaning [Sinn] of 
the original intuition itself (PSFv3 134/155-6). 
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Here, Cassirer emphasizes that, for Kant, the productive imagination is a capacity that, without 
recourse to discursive thought, enables us to immediately perceive objects as meaningful wholes.20  
And it is this idea that Cassirer seeks to develop in his own account of the representation function 
and pregnant perception.   
However, Cassirer has another reason to align the representation function with the 
productive imagination, viz., the tight connection he sees between our productive imagination and 
ability to ‘see’ possibilities.  As we saw above, for Kant, the imagination is our capacity ‘for 
representing an object even without its presence in intuition’.  This means that the imagination is 
not as directly confined to what is given here and now as is sensibility.  Of course, the reproductive 
imagination only has a limited distance from sensibility; however, the productive imagination has 
more freedom in this regard, as it is able to spontaneously produce representations.  This is another 
theme Cassirer picks up on, as he interprets the productive imagination as the “ability to interchange 
present and nonpresent, the real and the possible” (PSFv3 271/315).  Once again, Cassirer takes this 
to be the capacity that underwrites pregnant perception, for in this type of perception we are never 
stuck in just one way of looking at an object; rather, we can engage in ‘free play’ and vary our point 
of view so different meanings emerge (PSFv3 271/315).21  Indeed, it is through this free play of our 
imagination we are attuned to the vector of meaning that informs the object of pregnant perception.     
 
2.2 The representat ion funct ion and pathology 
As noted previously, on Cassirer’s view, the representation function is what malfunctions in 
pathological experience.  Cassirer argues that in pathology a patient’s productive imagination is 
compromised, her capacity for pregnant perception diminishes, and the vectors of meaning 
‘disintegrate’ (PSFv3 222/257).  Cassirer is clear that this does not amount to a total loss of these 
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sensory consciousness itself”; rather his claim is that in pathology, the patient’s perception is more 
restricted, it “moves within narrower limits, in smaller and more restricted circles than in the case of 
normal perception” (PSFv3 222/257).   
More specifically, Cassirer claims that pathological patients become oriented primarily 
towards meanings that are connected to what is “immediately perceived and desired” (PSFv3 
277/322).  To make this point, Cassirer compares the behavior of a pathological patient to the 
“merely purposive behaviour within the biological sphere” (PSFv3 276/321).22  He claims that 
animal perception is driven by the animal’s needs and goals and this leads the animal to focus on 
what is immediately present and practically relevant (PSFv3 276/321).  To be sure, Cassirer does not 
want to say a pathological patient is just like an animal; instead, he uses this comparison to elucidate 
the narrow circles of the patient’s perception.   
This diminishing of pregnant perception and the vectors of meaning manifests itself 
variously in the different pathologies Cassirer considers.  In his discussion of aphasia, Cassirer argues 
that a patient’s inability to name items stems from his inability to engage in pregnant perception.  In 
color amnesia, for example, Cassirer suggests that the patient is unable to name a colored swatch 
because he no longer sees this swatch as a sign of the relevant color-species.  Instead, the patient is 
focused exclusively on the immediate features of the swatch, e.g., its particular brightness and tone 
(PSFv3 225-7/261-3).  
Meanwhile in perceptual agnosia, e.g., psychic blindness, Cassirer argues that patients can no 
longer engage in a more basic form of pregnant perception: the patient cannot even perceive aspects 
of an object as ‘signs’ of a particular object.  For example, the patient cannot immediately grasp 
spatial features as features of an object (PSFv3 239-240/278).  Instead, Cassirer claims, he can 
identify an object only by resorting to discursive thought (PSFv3 239-240/279).  Describing his own 
encounter with an agnosiac, Cassirer notes that, at first, the patient sees only ‘a long black line with 
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something wide on top’ and that ‘the thing on top is transparent and has four bars’, and then draws 
the inference that the object is, therefore, a lamppost (PSFv3 241fn/279fn). 
However, for Cassirer, the inability to ‘see’ in terms of possibilities does not just beset our 
perceptions; it undermines our ability to think as well, hence results in cognitive agnosia.  In order to 
perform basic arithmetic, Cassirer suggests we must be able to regard the numbers in different 
possible ways, e.g., in order to do the equation 7-5=2, we must regard 7 as a ‘relative zero’ and count 
five steps backwards (PSFv3 250/291, 255-6/296-8).  The patient, however, can only regard the 
number 7 as the seventh number in the ordinary number sequence, not as a possible 0.  Likewise, in 
metaphorical thinking, we must be able to regard words or phrases as having both a literal and a 
figurative meaning; but for the patient, language is only literal and applicable to actual situations 
(PSFv3 254-9/295-300).  For example, a patient will be unable to say “It is bad, rainy weather today” 
if it is a sunny day (PSFv3 254/295). Cassirer attributes these issues to a problem with the patient’s 
productive imagination: he is anchored in the actual, closed off from the possible:  
[the patient] can form a sentence when he has solid support in something given, immediately 
experienced; without this support he is rudderless—he cannot venture out on the high seas 
of thought, which is a thought not only of realities but also of possibilities.  Hence he can 
express only what is actual and present, not what is merely imagined or possible (PSFv3 
257/298-9). 
 
Finally, we find a variation on this same theme in Cassirer’s analysis of apraxia; however, in 
these cases, it is his own body that the patient is unable to ‘see’ in terms of possibilities.  While a 
patient is able to engage in ‘concrete movements’ called for by the actual task he is engaged in, e.g., 
hammering in a workshop, he cannot engage in ‘abstract movements’, which are relevant to a non-
actual situation, e.g., mimicking hammering.  On Cassirer’s analysis, this is because the latter 
movements require the patient to be able to ‘see’ his body as capable of bearing on a merely possible 
or imagined situation; yet this is barred from the patient insofar as he is unable to spontaneously 
bring about those movements by projecting an imaginary scenario before himself (PSFv3 271/315).  
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As a consequence, the patient’s actions have become ‘fused’ to particular concrete tasks and he is 
limited to concrete movement (PSFv3 271/315).   
Summarizing his view, Cassirer remarks, 
Even though the [patient] can still apprehend and in general correctly handle what is “real,” 
concretely present, momentarily necessary, he lacks the spiritual view in the distance [geistige 
Fernblick], the vision [Sicht] of what is not before his eyes, of the merely possible (PSFv3 277, 
translation modified/322). 
 
This ultimately diminishes the ‘amplitude’ of a patient’s experience, altering her entire way of relating 
to the world through perception and thought, language and action (PSFv3 222/257).   
 
§3. Merleau-Ponty on Cassirer’s Diagnosis 
Sixteen years later in the Phenomenology of Perception, Merleau-Ponty takes up pathology from within a 
phenomenological framework.  Though I shall argue that Merleau-Ponty takes over the core of 
Cassirer’s analysis of pathology, it may initially be worried that Merleau-Ponty would have rejected it 
out of hand insofar as it turns on the function of representation.  Indeed, Merleau-Ponty criticizes 
several representational accounts of pathology: as he says in no uncertain terms with respect to 
apraxia, “The history of apraxia would show how the description of Praxis is almost always 
contaminated and, in the end, rendered impossible by the notion of representation” (PhP 525 
fn99/172 fn2).  In what follows, however, I show that Merleau-Ponty’s criticisms here are levied 
against traditional discursive accounts of representation, not against what he recognizes as Cassirer’s 
distinctive non-discursive account of representation.  
According to Merleau-Ponty, a traditional account treats representations as what are 
involved in judgments in which we subsume raw sense data under a concept (see PhP 123/152, 
129/160).  Thus, the ‘representation function’ is a discursive capacity, i.e., a capacity we have for 
judging that the sense data is representative of the concept.23  On such an account, pathological 
disorders amount to discursive disorders, i.e., problems with making judgments.  Though Merleau-
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Ponty criticizes such representational accounts, he also acknowledges that this is not the type of 
account that Cassirer gives.  This emerges in Merleau-Ponty’s analysis of Cassirer’s views about 
symbolic pregnance and the productive imagination.24   
Merleau-Ponty was so struck by Cassirer’s account of symbolic pregnance, he takes it over as 
his preferred way of characterizing the relationship between matter and form.  We get a glimpse of 
this in Merleau-Ponty’s summary remarks about the Phenomenology in ‘The Primacy of Perception’ 
(1946),  
we cannot apply the classical distinction of form and matter to perception, nor can we 
conceive the perceiving subject as consciousness which “interprets,” “deciphers,” or 
“orders” a sensible matter according to an ideal law which it possesses.  Matter is “pregnant” 
[prégnante] with form (PrP 12).25 
 
Making this point with an explicit citation to Cassirer in the Phenomenology, he suggests that the 
correct account of perception will emulate Cassirer’s: “we must acknowledge the symbolic 
“pregnance” [prégnance] of form in content as prior to the subsumption of content under form” (PhP 
304/344).  Given that Merleau-Ponty is here wielding Cassirer’s account against traditional 
representational accounts of perception, we have good reason to think Merleau-Ponty set Cassirer’s 
account apart.   
Furthermore, Merleau-Ponty is sensitive to the fact that rather than emphasizing judgment, 
Cassirer emphasizes the productive imagination.  This is important because, more generally, Kant’s 
notion of the productive imagination stands in Merleau-Ponty’s good favor, as something proto-
phenomenological.  Indeed, Merleau-Ponty thinks that the phenomenological analysis of 
intentionality has its roots in Kant’s account of the productive imagination (PhP xxxi/17-8).  Recall 
that, for Kant, in order for experience to be possible, the productive imagination must mediate 
between sensibility and understanding.  To this end, Kant rather suggestively claims that our ability 
to make judgments depends on the imagination’s “hidden art [Kunst] in the depths of the human 
soul” (A141/B180).  Merleau-Ponty interprets this claim as follows: 
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the hidden art of the imagination must condition the categorial activity; it is no longer merely 
aesthetic judgment that rests upon this hidden art, but also knowledge [connaissance], and this 
art also grounds the unity of consciousness (PhP xxxi/18).  
  
This idea, however, is one he regards as a precursor to the idea found in Heidegger and the later 
Husserl that the intentionality of any particular act, e.g., this judgment, is grounded in a deeper 
intentionality, ‘operative intentionality’, that lies beneath and unifies every act (PhP xxxii/18).26  To 
be sure, Merleau-Ponty wants to distance ‘operative intentionality’ from Kant’s conception of the 
productive imagination as a mental capacity;27 however, he takes the kernel of Kant’s account to be 
worth developing. 
Indeed, we see him highlight what is fruitful in the notion of the productive imagination in 
his discussion of Cassirer’s treatment of pathology.  Merleau-Ponty quotes Cassirer’s discussion of 
the disintegration of the vectors of meaning at length (PhP 197-8/233, citing PSFv3 222/257).  He 
cites this passage, in particular, because he thinks it reveals Cassirer’s sensitivity to the productive 
imagination as the real root of pathology:  
Such is the disorder of “thought” that is discovered at the basis of [color] amnesia.  It clearly 
has to do less with judgment than with the milieu of experience in which judgment is born, 
less with spontaneity than with the holds of this spontaneity upon the perceptible world and 
our power to imagine [figurer] any intention whatever in the world.  In Kantian terms, it 
affects less the understanding that the productive imagination (PhP 198/233). 
 
Here, we see Merleau-Ponty applaud Cassirer for analyzing the problems of pathology not in the 
discursive terms of judgment, but rather in terms of the productive imagination.  In fact, as we shall 
see in what follows, Merleau-Ponty preserves the idea that pathology affects our spontaneous ability 
to ‘imagine’ [figurer] our intentions in the world in his own account.  In which case, far from rejecting 
Cassirer’s account of pathology, then, Merleau-Ponty is drawn to it as a non-discursive alternative to 
traditional representational accounts.     
 This being said, we must acknowledge that Merleau-Ponty does not think Cassirer’s view is 
without fault.  In an important footnote, Merleau-Ponty suggests that there is a fundamental tension 
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in Cassirer’s account: while he regards Cassirer’s theory of symbolic pregnance as a 
“phenomenological and even existential” analysis, he worries that Cassirer’s analysis of the 
representation function ultimately involves “the return to the self of an eternal consciousness,” 
hence a “return to intellectualism” (PhP 521-2 fn 67/162 fn2).  It is, in particular, Cassirer’s 
disregard for the body in relation to the representation function that gives Merleau-Ponty pause.  
Though Cassirer may have offered a non-discursive account of representation, by Merleau-Ponty’s 
lights, Cassirer did not go so far as to acknowledge the bodily foundation of the representation 
function.  As Merleau-Ponty puts it, ‘intellectualism’s error’ is to make the representation function 
“depend on itself, [and] to separate it from… [our] direct presence in the world,” i.e., through our 
bodies (PhP 126/157).   
According to Merleau-Ponty, consciousness is not something that is exclusively intellectual; 
rather, he argues that, “Consciousness is being toward the thing through the intermediary of the 
body” (PhP 140/173).  Though we can be intentionally directed towards the world through our 
thoughts, he maintains that we can also be directed towards the world through our bodies; hence, he 
urges that we must recognize “the body itself as a… “motor intentionality”” (PhP 113/141).28  
Indeed, insofar as we are always directed towards the world through our bodies, he describes motor 
intentionality as ‘original intentionality’ (see PhP 139-140/171-3).  By Merleau-Ponty’s lights, then, 
Cassirer’s account of the representation function, although an advance over discursive accounts, 
nevertheless fails to address the bodily ground of consciousness (see PhP 126-7/157-8).  As he puts 
it, for a patient suffering a brain injury, it would be “absurd to think that the shrapnel collided with 
symbolic consciousness.  Rather, his Spirit is affected through vision” (PhP 127/158).  However, 
this does not lead him to reject Cassirer all together; rather, just as with symbolic pregnance, 
Merleau-Ponty appropriates those aspects of Cassirer’s account he thinks are phenomenologically 
viable, while leaving the rest aside.   
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§4. Merleau-Ponty’s Diagnosis of Pathology: the Function of Projection 
We are now in a position to examine Merleau-Ponty’s positive account of pathology and what, I 
argue, are its Kantian roots.  In what follows, I show that Merleau-Ponty follows Cassirer in offering 
what I shall call an ‘imagination-centric’ account of pathology.  Though the imagination does not 
take shape in the representation function, we find Merleau-Ponty give it new shape in his account of 
the ‘function of projection’, which is at the heart of his analysis of pathology.   
 
4.1 The motor-centr i c  interpretat ions 
My imagination-centric interpretation differs from what I have labeled the ‘motor-centric’ 
interpretation that currently dominates the literature.  On this latter interpretation, Merleau-Ponty 
uses his account of pathology primarily to elucidate bodily movement and action.  What inclines 
commentators more generally towards this type of interpretation is the fact that the topic of the 
body and its movements dominates Merleau-Ponty’s treatment of pathology in Part One of the 
Phenomenology.  Indeed, Merleau-Ponty sets up his discussion of pathology by focusing on apraxia, 
i.e., the pathology associated with movement (see PhP 105-112/132-140) and he uses this discussion 
to draw out some of his central philosophical theses about the body, e.g., the ‘motor intentionality’ 
of our bodies and the ‘body schema’ (see PhP 112-3/140-1, 100-3/127-131).   
There are two competing varieties of the motor-centric interpretation presently on offer.  
First, drawing on Merleau-Ponty’s claims that we have a ‘pre-reflective’ or ‘pre-logical’ experience of 
the world, there is the unreflective motor-centric interpretation according to which Merleau-Ponty 
intends for pathology to clarify how we unreflectively relate to the world through our bodily actions 
and movements.29  Commentators like Dreyfus, Sean Kelly, and Taylor Carman30 have defended this 
position, maintaining that Merleau-Ponty uses pathology to highlight features of ‘absorbed coping’, 
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i.e., our bodily way of dealing with the world that occurs without the intervention of thought or 
reflection.31  Challenging this line of thought, Romdenh-Romluc has put forth a reflective variety of 
the motor-centric interpretation, according to which Merleau-Ponty uses pathology to explain an 
important kind of bodily action, viz., action guided by thought ((2007), (2011): 93-102).  On her 
account, the textual evidence suggests that Merleau-Ponty uses pathology not just to highlight our 
unreflective capacities, but also to elucidate a particular reflective capacity, viz., “the power to reckon 
with the possible”’ (PhP 112/139).32  On her gloss, the power to reckon with the possible is “the 
power to access—and so use—motor skills that are relevant to merely possible tasks and 
environments,” where ‘merely possible’ refers to the tasks or environments I represent in thought 
((2007): 52, (2011): 94).33  Though her account is still oriented towards explaining bodily action, her 
view is unique insofar as she allows for reflection to play a pivotal role in guiding that action.34   
In what follows, I show that the motor-centric interpretation’s exclusive emphasis on what 
pathology teaches us about bodily action, whether this be guided by thought or not, is misplaced.  
To be sure, Merleau-Ponty devotes a great deal of attention to the relationship between pathology 
and bodily action; however, this constitutes but one aspect of his overall project.  As the 
imagination-centric interpretation reveals, Merleau-Ponty has a more fundamental aim, viz., 
highlighting something like the productive imagination, which he calls the ‘function of projection’, 
which brings unity to the various ways we deal with the world through action, perception, emotion, 
thought, etc.  
 
4.2 The funct ion o f  pro je c t ion 
Throughout the Phenomenology, Merleau-Ponty argues that it is a mistake to think of the human 
subject as somehow isolated from the external world; rather, drawing on Heidegger, he claims each 
of us is an embodied ‘being-in-the-world’, i.e., we are essentially bound up with the world around us 
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(PhP lxxvii/13).  Our experience, then, is not the result of something wholly ‘inside’ interacting with 
something wholly ‘outside’; it is determined by a more ‘organic’ relationship between us and the 
world (PhP 154/189).  According to Merleau-Ponty, this means, in part, that we do not experience 
the world as something entirely alien; rather, it is full of what J.J. Gibson called ‘affordances’, i.e., 
‘invitations’ or ‘summons’ to act in certain ways (PhP 331/373).35  However, our experience is not 
merely a matter of being sensitive to the world’s invitations, for in that case, there would be but a 
one-sided between us and the world.  Instead, as we shall see in what follows, Merleau-Ponty urges 
that the way the world summons us is, in turn, shaped by our own intentions, e.g., I see a coffee cup 
as something ‘to pick up’ because I need to wake up.  This is a fundamental feature of human 
existence and it is what Merleau-Ponty endeavors to elucidate with his account of the function of 
projection.   
Merleau-Ponty defines the function of projection as,  
[the] power of marking out borders and directions in the given world, of establishing lines of 
force, of arranging perspectives, of organizing the given world according to the projects of 
the moment, and of constructing upon the geographical surroundings a milieu of behavior 
and a system of significations that express, on the outside, the internal activity of the 
subject… the normal person’s projects polarize the world (PhP 115/143). 
 
As he makes this point later, “for the normal person, the subject’s intentions are immediately 
reflected in the perceptual field: they polarize it, put their stamp on it, or finally, effortlessly give 
birth there to a wave of significations” (PhP 133/164-5).  Now, this characterization of projection 
has seemed worrisome to some insofar as it appears to appeal to a view of the subject that Merleau-
Ponty rejects;36 however, as we see in the following passage, Merleau-Ponty does not think that there 
is a de facto tension between the idea that the subject is inseparable from the world and that she 
projects it:  
The world is inseparable from the subject, but from a subject who is nothing but a project of 
the world; and the subject is inseparable from the world, but from a world that it itself 
projects.  The subject is being-in-the-world and the world remains ‘subjective’ (PhP 
454/493).37 
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Far from distancing himself from the notion of projection, Merleau-Ponty, in fact, puts it at the core 
of subjectivity.  In which case, his account of the function of projection plays a crucial role in 
elucidating the type of subjects we are.   
In order to clarify what sorts of intentions are at stake in projection, Merleau-Ponty 
introduces the notion of the ‘intentional arc’ (PhP 137/169-170, 160/194).38  He describes the 
intentional arc as follows: 
the life of consciousness—epistemic life, the life of desire, or perceptual life—is 
underpinned by an “intentional arc” that projects around us our past, our future, our human 
milieu, our physical situation, our ideological situation, and our moral situation, or rather, 
that ensures that we are situated within all of these relationships (PhP 137/169-170).39 
 
This passage reveals that Merleau-Ponty is not concerned with how we project the world solely in 
light of one type of intention, e.g., those related to bodily movement; he is interested in how we 
project the world in light of rich variety of intentions.  Likewise, Merleau-Ponty does not privilege 
intentions that are explicit or reflective; there can also be implicit intentions that we project the 
world in light of that fall on this arc.  The intentional arc, then, involves a spectrum of intentions, 
which are all underwritten by the same ‘core function’, i.e., the function of projection.40  
It is in this regard that the function of projection with its intentional arc begins to betray its 
Kantian roots.41  Recall that, for Kant, the productive imagination is responsible for mediating 
between two seemingly distinct capacities: sensibility and understanding.  As we saw above, on 
Merleau-Ponty’s interpretation, this means that the imagination ‘grounds the unity of consciousness’, 
i.e., it unifies how we relate to the world in these different ways (PhP xxxi/18).42  Merleau-Ponty, 
however, treats the intentional arc in a similar way, claiming that it “creates the unity of the senses, 
the unity of the senses with intelligence, and the unity of sensitivity and motricity” (PhP 137/169-
170).  Like Kant before him, then, he takes there to be a special function (of imagination, of 
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projection) that grounds the divergent ways we have of relating to the world and gives unity to the 
different facets of our existence.   
However, Merleau-Ponty has a further reason for linking the productive imagination to the 
function of projection: like Cassirer before him, Merleau-Ponty takes the function of projection to 
open us up to possibilities.  In Merleau-Ponty’s words, our existence is not “enclosed in the actual”; in 
addition to being “mobilized by real situations… [we can] be situated in the virtual” (PhP 111/139).  
Merleau-Ponty claims that there are always “motor, perceptual and even intellectual possibilities” 
open to us and the function of projection gives us the freedom to divert ourselves into these 
different possibilities (PhP 158/193).  Merleau-Ponty, however, recognizes this as a Kantian idea, for 
as we saw in his discussion of Cassirer, he associates Kant’s notion of the productive imagination 
with the ‘spontaneity’ involved in our hold on the world and the ‘power to imagine [figurer] any 
intention whatever in the world’ (PhP 198/233, my emphasis).  To be sure, Merleau-Ponty does not 
want to retain any intellectualistic connotations of the productive imagination from Kant; 
nevertheless, his function of projection preserves the unifying, projective, and spontaneous features 
he associates with the productive imagination.  
Although this way of presenting the function of projection may seem like what Romdenh-
Romluc has in mind in her discussion of the power to reckon with the possible, there is an 
important difference between our accounts: I take ‘reckoning with the possible’ to be more 
pervasive than Romdenh-Romluc does.  Romdenh-Romluc gives what we could call a practical 
reading of the power to reckon with the possible: it explains a sub-set of practical actions, which 
involve the exercise of our motor skills in response to a merely possible environment represented in 
thought.  My reading, however, is broader than this practical reading for I interpret the ‘possible’ we 
reckon with to include the wide variety of intentions falling on the intentional arc.    That is to say, I 
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take us to be reckoning with the possible not just when we engage in practical activities, but when 
we take up any intention on the arc, whether it be more practically oriented or not.   
 
4.3 The funct ion o f  pro je c t ion and pathology 
Turning now to Merleau-Ponty’s account of pathology, we find that he, like Cassirer before him, 
identifies his version of the Kantian productive imagination, viz., the function of projection, as the 
root of pathological disorders.  On his view, in pathological experience the function of projection no 
longer works properly and the intentional arc “goes limp” (PhP 137/170).  Echoing Cassirer, 
Merleau-Ponty claims pathological patients can no longer project the world in light of multiple 
intentions; rather, their experience becomes ‘enclosed in the actual’ (PhP 111/139).  Insofar as 
Merleau-Ponty offers us an analysis of pathology in terms of the function of projection, he provides 
what we might call a ‘holistic’ analysis, i.e., he endeavors to elucidate what has gone wrong in a 
patient’s life as a whole, not just what besets her ability to move her body.   
To be sure, Merleau-Ponty devotes a good deal of attention to explaining what goes wrong 
in apraxia and this is what the motor-centric interpretations tend to focus on.  In normal experience, 
Merleau-Ponty suggests a person,  
does not have his body available merely as implicated in a concrete milieu, he is not merely 
situated in relation to tasks set by his trade.…  Rather, in addition he possesses his body as 
the correlate of pure stimuli stripped of all practical signification; he is open to verbal and 
fictional situations that he can choose for himself or that a researcher might suggest (PhP 
111/139). 
 
The patient, by contrast, is confined to the actual, barred from ‘verbal and fictional situations’.  Shy 
of being able to freely put herself in these latter situations, the patient can only engage in concrete 
movements, relevant to ‘the actual’, i.e., what is immediately present to him or relevant to a 
particular task (see PhP 106-109/133-137).   
Still, it is important to see that Merleau-Ponty’s account of apraxia is but one moment of his 
overall analysis of pathology.  Indeed, he sees the problem underlying apraxia as manifesting in other 
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pathological disorders as well.  Beginning with aphasia, he argues that in an experience like color 
amnesia, if a doctor asks the patient to group the ‘red’ samples together, he cannot do so because he 
cannot organize the world in light of that task.  He cannot see the samples as possibly having 
meaning related to the word ‘red’ or to the doctor’s request; instead, each sample is inert and 
remains “confined within its individual existence” (PhP 197/232).  Likewise in perceptual agnosia, 
Merleau-Ponty claims a patient cannot immediately recognize an object upon a doctor’s request 
because the request, ‘tell me what object that is’, is an empty one: it does not signal to the patient a 
task he could undertake and organize the world in light of (PhP 110/137).   
Merleau-Ponty goes on to suggest that these issues with the function of projection are also 
expressed in intellectual disorders, disorders that tend to be neglected by the motor-centric 
interpretation.  For example, Merleau-Ponty claims that if a patient is not able to use or understand a 
metaphor, this is because he is not able to project different possible ways a word could have 
meaning.  A patient cannot, for example, understand the metaphor ‘the chair leg’ because he does 
not take the word ‘leg’ to include a possible reference to chairs (PhP 129/160-1).  Likewise, in 
disorders affecting a patient’s ability to engage in mathematical thought, Merleau-Ponty claims he is 
unable to project the number in multiple ways; he is confined to seeing the number only as 
occupying a fixed place in the number sequence (PhP 135/167).  Or, in geometrical disorders, 
Merleau-Ponty suggests that if a patient cannot make a square from four isosceles triangles, this is 
because he cannot project those triangles in terms of an ‘imaginary meaning’, i.e., as possible 
constituents of a square (PhP 133/165).     
However, though Merleau-Ponty is concerned, in part, with explaining how each particular 
disorder manifests the same problem, it is crucial to recognize that the center-piece of his analysis is 
his explanation of why pathology manifests holistically, i.e., why linguistic, perceptual, motor, and 
cognitive disorders go hand in hand.  According to Merleau-Ponty, when a patient’s intentional arc 
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‘goes limp’, this reverberates across her experience as she is ‘confined to the actual’ in everything she 
does, perceives, thinks, and feels.   
Merleau-Ponty emphasizes the holistic effect of pathology most in his discussion of one of 
Gelb and Goldstein’s patients, ‘Schneider’, who suffered a brain injury from a shell splinter.  One of 
the results of Schneider’s injury is his inability to both initiate sexual contact, and, if he stumbles into 
such a situation, bring the act to completion.  Merleau-Ponty analyzes this situation as follows,  
The patient has lost the power of projecting before himself a sexual world, of putting 
himself into an erotic situation, or, once the situation is under way, of sustaining it or of 
following it through to satisfaction… the tactile stimuli themselves… have, so to speak, 
ceased speaking to his body… because the patient has ceased posing to his surrounding that 
silent and permanent question that defines normal sexuality (PhP 159/193-4).  
 
However, Merleau-Ponty goes on to point out that Schneider’s sexual problems are accompanied by 
a wide-range of other problems: he can no longer place himself, 
within an affective or ideological situation… Faces are neither pleasant nor unpleasant… 
The sun and the rain are neither joyful nor sad… the world is affectively neutral… He would 
like to be able to think about politics or religion, but he never even tries (PhP 159-160/194). 
 
According to Merleau-Ponty, Schneider suffers from this suite of problems because the intentional 
arc of his life has given way: the multiple possible intentions normally available have become leveled 
down.  This leads Merleau-Ponty to claim that Schneider’s case reveals, 
the vital roots of perception, motricity, and representation, by grounding all of these 
“processes” upon an “intentional arc” that weakens for the patient and that for the normal 
subject gives experience its degree of vitality and fecundity (PhP 160/195). 
 
This, then, is the lesson Merleau-Ponty draws from pathology: it elucidates not one facet of our 
lives, but the unity of our lives as a whole.    
 
4.4 Merleau-Ponty ’s  advance o f  the product ive  imaginat ion 
So far, I have emphasized that rather than being motor-centric, Merleau-Ponty’s account of 
pathology, like Cassirer’s before him, is imagination-centric.  This interpretation makes better sense 
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of not only Merleau-Ponty’s claim that pathology is traceable back to the function of projection and 
intentional arc, but also his emphasis on the holistic effect of pathology.  However, even if the 
imagination-centric interpretation is right and points towards the Kantian roots of Merleau-Ponty’s 
account of pathology, Merleau-Ponty does not simply appropriate the productive imagination as it is 
presented in Kant or in Cassirer; for, unlike his predecessors, he explicitly takes up the embodied 
nature of the productive imagination.   
Regardless of whether Kant or Cassirer ultimately thought the productive imagination has an 
important relationship to us as embodied human beings, this is not a feature of their account either 
chooses to emphasize.43  By contrast, Merleau-Ponty highlights the bodily nature of the productive 
imagination in the three following ways.  To begin, Merleau-Ponty maintains that our productive 
imagination can be exercised through our bodies without the involvement of the intellect.  For 
example, Merleau-Ponty suggests that even if I have not reflectively formed an intention to pick 
something up, if I reach towards it with my hand, this movement will involve the intentionality of 
my body (PhP 140/172).  In which case, rather than characterizing the productive imagination as a 
mental capacity, he treats it as one that can manifest through the body alone.44  Second, insofar as 
Merleau-Ponty defines consciousness as being towards the world through our bodies, then any 
conscious act will somehow involve motor intentionality.  This is not to say that every conscious act 
will involve an intention to move my body in a particular way; rather, his idea is that whether we are 
engaged in bodily movement, reflective thought, or some other conscious activity, we are directed 
towards the world through our bodies.45  This, in turn, means that for Merleau-Ponty the intellectual 
exercise of our productive imaginations depends on our embodiment and what he calls motor 
intentionality.  Third, however, Merleau-Ponty also acknowledges that there is a reciprocal relationship 
between our bodily dealings with the world and our more reflective engagement with it:  
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there is no single movement in a living body that is an absolute accident with regard to 
psychical intentions and no single psychical act that has not found at least its germ or its 
general outline in physiological dispositions (PhP 90/117-8). 
 
There thus appears to be a dynamic relation between the different ways we have of projecting, 
whether they be more or less oriented towards our embodied or cognitive existence.  Indeed, this is 
what should be expected insofar as Merleau-Ponty treats these facets of our existence as unified 
expressions of one and the same projective function.   
 
§5. Conclusion: Merleau-Ponty and the Kantian Tradition 
In this paper, I have tried to show that there is considerable insight to be gained into Merleau-
Ponty’s philosophical use of pathology if we acknowledge the ways in which he was influenced by 
Cassirer’s Kantian account of pathology.  While some have been tempted to read Merleau-Ponty’s 
account of pathology as teaching us lessons about our motor lives, I have shown that he is making a 
deeper point about our lives as embodied human beings who organize the world in light of 
intentions.  This is why, I claimed, Merleau-Ponty is drawn to Cassirer’s analysis of pathology in 
terms of the productive imagination.  For, on Cassirer’s gloss, Kant’s productive imagination is a 
non-discursive capacity that not only underwrites our various ways of relating to the world, but also 
opens us up to different possible ways of projecting the world.  Merleau-Ponty understands his own 
function of projection and intentional arc in these terms and this leads him to offer an imagination-
centric account of pathology.    
However, this fruitful line of interpretation will only go forward if we reverse the trend to 
read Merleau-Ponty’s philosophy as pitted against Kant’s.  As our discussion has revealed, rather 
than reject the Kantian tradition all together, Merleau-Ponty levies criticisms against what he 
disagrees with and embraces what he takes to be promising.  Our understanding of Merleau-Ponty’s 
relationship to Kant should take into account these nuances.  The present analysis of the role the 
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productive imagination plays in Merleau-Ponty’s account of pathology has been one step in this 
direction; however, much work remains to be done to expose the Kantian themes in Merleau-
Ponty’s philosophy, indeed phenomenology, more generally.46  
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2 Though Merleau-Ponty’s analysis of the ‘phantom limb’ phenomena has garnered quite a bit of attention (see Gallagher 
(1995) and Carman (2008b): 98-102), in this paper I shall focus, instead, on the pathologies related to aphasia, agnosia, 
and apraxia, which are the subject of the chapters titled ‘‘The Spatiality of One’s Own Body and Motricity’, ‘The Body as 
a Sexed Being’, and ‘The Body as Expression, and Speech’. 
3 Citations to Philosophie der symbolischen Formen. Dritter Teil (PSFv3) will be to the English/German pagination. 
4 See Dreyfus (2007), Romdenh-Romluc (2007), (2011), as well as Kelly (2000), Carman (2008a) 
5 See, e.g., Merleau-Ponty’s criticism of Kant’s view of consciousness (PhP xx/9, 317/358).   
6 See, e.g., Matthews (2006): 31 and Rockmore (2011): Chapter 6 
7 We find this notably in the Dreyfus-McDowell debates: Dreyfus (2006); McDowell (2007a), (2007b).  In the literature 
on Kant, we find this in Waxman (1991): 18, 195, 212fn40; Longuenesse (1998): 204, 271, 395; and Melnick (2009): 126-
130.  In addition to Matthews and Rockmore, further examples in the literature on Merleau-Ponty are Carman (2005): 
59, (2008a): 12, (2008b): 47; and Romdenh-Romluc (2011): 20, 54. 
8 They were also both familiar with the work of Marie, van Woerkom, Benary, and Liepmann. 
9 For a discussion of Cassirer and pathology, see Krois (2007). 
10 For a broader discussion of Cassirer’s Philosophy of Symbolic Forms, see Krois (1987), Bayer (2001), Luft (2004), 
Barash (2008), Friedman (2011), Verene (2011). 
11 See also PSFv3 14-5/18. 
12 As he puts it in PSFv3, “From the standpoint of phenomenological inquiry there is no more a “matter in itself” than a 
“form in itself”; there are only total experiences [Gesamterlebnisse] which can be compared from the standpoint of matter 
and form” (199/230). 
13 See also PSFv3 235/273. 
14 Though there may be alternative views of discursivity, for Cassirer and Merleau-Ponty discursivity involves the act of 
mentally processing sense data through concepts in a judgment.  
15 Krois (1987): 52-3 suggests that Cassirer was influenced by the Gestalt psychologists, whereas Freudenthal (2004): 211 
points out that Cassirer explicitly connects his use of ‘Prägnanz’ to Leibniz’s notion of ‘praegnans futuri’, i.e., that “the now 
is filled and saturated with a future” (PSFv3 202).    
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16 For further discussion of symbolic pregnance, see Rosengren (2007), Verene (2011): 53-5. 
17 References to Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason are to the section number and A and B pagination of the first and second 
editions.  All other references are to the volume and page of Kants gesammelte Schriften.   
18 See also Anthro 7:154: “the power of imagination… is the faculty of… intuition even without the presence of an object.” 
19 Kant also allows for the productive imagination to be exercised empirically in image formation (A141/B181), 
mathematically in geometrical construction (A164/B205), and aesthetically in judgments of taste and genius.   
20 It is a matter of debate whether Kant himself thinks perception can occur through sensibility and imagination alone, 
without the influence of the understanding, see, e.g., Ginsborg (2008), Allais (2009). 
21 The notion of ‘free play’ is drawn from the third Critique.   
22 This is a gloss on Gelb and Goldstein’s claim that pathological behavior is ‘closer to life’ (PSFv3 226/262, 275/320) 
23 “A ‘representative function’… consists in treating the sensory givens as representatives of each other and, when taken 
together, as representative of an “eidos”” (PhP 123/153). 
24 Though I will not pursue this further, Merleau-Ponty also distinguishes Cassirer’s account from traditional 
representational accounts insofar as Cassirer acknowledges that representation is not the only way we have of relating to 
the world; we can relate to is through mythical and expressive attitudes as well (PhP 303-4/343-4).   
25 See also PhP 154/189 
26 Merleau-Ponty claims he has in mind Heidegger’s views of ‘transcendence’ in Being and Time and Husserl’s views in 
Formal and Transcendental Logic (see PhP 441/480, 453/492). 
27 Kant describes the imagination as a ‘faculty of the soul’ (A94), a ‘function of the soul’ (A78/B103) and as involving 
‘actions of the mind’ (A102). 
28 For a more thorough discussion of Merleau-Ponty’s account of motor intentionality, see Kelkel (1988), Kelly (2000), 
Saint Aubert (2005), Jensen (2009).  I return to this topic below. 
29 See PhP 241/279, 311/351, 349/311, 547fn3/357 and Carman (2008a): 28, 81 Dreyfus (2006): 47-8 Kelly (2002). 
30 Dreyfus, Kelly, and Carman are, in part, drawn to this interpretation because they see it as connected to Heidegger’s 
notion of ‘understanding’ as ‘know-how’ (BT ¶31).  See Carman (2008a): 224. 
31 See Dreyfus (2007).  More specifically, he argues that the study of pathology illuminates the flexibility involved in 
normal absorbed coping, i.e., our ability to be summoned to new tasks (63, 64, 69).  Kelly (2000) emphasizes that apraxia 
reveals something important about two different ways we have of engaging with the world, through ‘grasping’ 
movements and ‘pointing movements’.  Meanwhile, Carman (2008a) claims that Merleau-Ponty’s discussion of 
pathology reveals the non-cognitive intelligence of our bodies (111, 113).   
32 Cassirer also alludes to it on PSFv3 243/283: “Orientation in this space [the space of possibility] presupposes an 
ability of consciousness to actualize these possibilities freely and reckon [zu rechnen] with them in advance, in an intuitive 
and intellectual anticipation.”  
33 She gives examples of performing kick-boxing moves against an imagined assailant ((2011): 97), and mimicking martial 
arts moves in a fight scene against an ‘imagined’ alien ((2007): 51).   
34 To her account, Dreyfus (2007) objects that Merleau-Ponty cannot address how thought guides bodily action because 
Merleau-Ponty has ‘nothing to say’ about how abstract thought is possible (67).  This, I think, goes too far.  While it may 
be true that giving a fully developed account of abstract thought is not Merleau-Ponty’s aim in the Phenomenology, as will 
emerge below, Merleau-Ponty recognizes that we are human beings who have both bodies and minds, and that any 
proper account of the phenomenology of our perception must take into account how our bodily engagement with the 
world is shaped by our cognitive lives, and vice versa. 
35 For a discussion of this point, see Dreyfus (2007). 
36 See Saint Aubert (2005): 137, Dreyfus (2007): 62-4  
37 Merleau-Ponty cites Heidegger here (BT 418/366).  It is perhaps also worth mentioning that the idea of projection 
plays a pivotal role in Heidegger’s account of understanding in ¶31 of BT.  
38 Insofar as I take the notion of the intentional arc to be one Merleau-Ponty commits himself to, I agree with Kelkel 
(1988) and disagree with Saint Aubert (2005) who argues that the discussion of the intentional arc is a ‘confused attempt’ 
[tentative confuse] that is ‘immediately aborted’ [aussitôt avortée] (138fn, my transl.).   
39 Merleau-Ponty borrows the term ‘intentional arc’ (‘intentionale Bogen’ in German) from the literature on schizophrenia, 
specifically from Fischer (1929), who takes it from its original source, Beringer (1926).  According to Beringer, 
schizophrenia does not affect a particular operation of thought, but rather a “much more general… underlying function, 
which impinges on the unity of the formal structure of thought” (191, my transl.).  Ordinarily, he argues, we can think 
about how something present is connected to other possibilities and he labels this pattern of connection ‘the range 
[Spannweite] of the intentional arc’  (190, my transl.).  In schizophrenia, however, he claims that there is a ‘relaxation’ 
[Lockerung] of the intentional arc, such that the patient is no longer able to consider these connections (193, my transl.).  
Fischer further develops this thought by arguing that the ‘relaxation of the intentional arc’ affects not only thought, but 
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also how a patient organizes space and time (250, 255).  As Merleau-Ponty describes Fischer’s point, pathology involves 
a “more general disturbance” that affects “a deeper life of consciousness beneath “perception”” (PhP 295/334).     
40 I agree with Kelkel (1988) who argues that the intentionality underwriting the intentional arc is ‘motor intentionality’.  
However, it is important to recognize that motor intentionality is not simply a matter of intending to move our bodies in 
a certain way; rather, it is a more generic form of intentionality that characterizes our conscious orientation towards the 
world through our bodies, whether we are engaging in bodily movement, ethical deliberation, reflective contemplation, 
etc.   
41 Of course, it is not only Kant who influences Merleau-Ponty’s conception of the function of projection and the 
intentional arc.  As we saw above, Merleau-Ponty thinks of Kant’s theory of the imagination as a precursor to the 
phenomenological conception of intentionality at work in Heidegger’s discussion of ‘transcendence’ and Husserl’s 
discussion of ‘operative intentionality’.  Although we cannot pursue this further here, Merleau-Ponty is particularly 
influenced by the connection Heidegger and Husserl draw between intentionality and temporality.  As becomes clear in 
the ‘Temporality’ chapter, Merleau-Ponty ultimately thinks of transcendence or operative intentionality in temporal 
terms (PhP 441/480).  Drawing particularly on Husserl’s On the Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Internal Time, Merleau-
Ponty argues that since the operative intentionality that underwrites all of our intentions is essentially temporal, our 
intentions will have a complex temporal structure that determines and unifies them.  More specifically, he follows 
Husserl in claiming that every present intention is a ‘retention’, i.e., it preserves (or projects) the past, and a ‘protention’, 
i.e., it anticipates (or projects) the future (PhP 439/478).  This, in turn, means that temporality is something that unites 
together our past, present, and future intentions: time, as Merleau-Ponty puts it, is a “network [réseau] of intentionalities” 
(PhP 440/479).  For Merleau-Ponty, then, beyond the Kantian account of the imagination, the phenomenological 
account of temporality is needed to clarify the temporal nature of the function of projection and the intentional arc.   
42 Merleau-Ponty’s interpretation seems to have been influenced by Heidegger’s claim in Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics 
that the imagination is the ‘common root’ of sensibility and understanding.  As Henrich (1994) argues, this is a 
contentious interpretation of Kant.   
43 To be clear, this is not to say that Kant or Cassirer could not accommodate views of embodiment in this regard, rather 
the point is that they did not, as Merleau-Ponty did, see it as something necessary to address.   
44 As Merleau-Ponty puts it, our lives involve “this back-and-forth of existence that sometimes allows itself to exist as a 
body and sometimes carries itself into personal acts” (PhP 90/117). 
45 On this point, I agree with Saint Aubert’s (2005) suggestion that Merleau-Ponty’s analysis of motor intentionality is 
part of his effort to elucidate the most fundamental intentionality of our existence, i.e., the intentionality at stake in the 
intentional arc, function of projection, and ‘operative intentionality’.  As noted above, however, this means that motor 
intentionality cannot be narrowly exhausted by intentions to move our bodies.   
46 I am grateful for helpful feedback and insightful comments on this paper from Michael Beaney, William Blattner, 
Pierre Keller, Erich Reck, Charles Siewert, Clinton Tolley, Mark Wrathall, the audience at the 2012 SIPHOP Meeting, 
and two anonymous referees. 
